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The main feature of the privatization process in 
Belarus is its absence. The authorities have repeat-
edly claimed that the Belarusian economy is open 
for Western businesses and investment, however, 
the country’s economy continues to be closed and 
regulated while privatization is very limited in scope. 
In other words, the political regime, suffering the 
lack of financial resources, still prefers to keep con-
trol over the economy, thus preventing unexpected 
changes in the political system.    
The main goal of the Belarusian privatization is to 
attract investment without being obliged to trans-
form its economic or social foundations. Therefore 
the political regime in Belarus is looking for partners 
not in the West but among countries with similar 
forms of governance. Western investors demand 
legal guarantees for their businesses while the legal 
framework in Belarus is far from perfect, what is 
more, it often fails to function. Serious business in 
Belarus is possible only by expanding a personal 
network of ‘protectors’ among top officials in gov-
ernmental institutions. Businesses from undemo-
cratic countries are a lot more acquainted with such 
schemes of doing business.
Russian Business and Politics
Russian business playing the primary role in the 
privatization process is an important feature of 
Belarusian privatization. Despite regular conflicts 
and ‘wars’, Belarus still remains an important object 
for Russian business and capital. The following 
circumstances influence this tendency. 
First, there is a lack of internal financial resources 
and big national businesses in Belarus that could 
compete with Russians. 
Second, the orientation of the Belarusian economy 
towards the Russian market, strong energy and 
export dependence on Russia helps Russian capital 
enter the Belarusian market. 
Moreover, the union state ensures both openness 
of state borders and easy access to the Belarusian 
market. 
Political and administrative restrictions as well as 
unfavorable conditions for Western investment 
that cannot compete with Russian businesses is 
yet another factor determining the dominance of 
Russian investments since Western business in 
Belarus is represented only by small and medium 
companies. 
Privatization in Belarus continues. Some experts 
argue that its process, conditions and estimated 
prices of enterprises let us believe this pretended 
privatization is being carried out in order to please 
IMF rather than to stabilize the economy. However, 
announcement of the possible sale of 20 percent 
of the strategic enterprise Belaruskali proves that 
Belarusian authorities are really short of financial 
resources. Not surprising was the fact that the 
most likely buyer of this share is China. Relations 
between Belarus and China continually intensify, 
particularly in the spheres of economy and supply 
of military equipment. More about the peculiari-
ties of the Belarusian privatization and who will 
save the Belarusian economy read in Pavel Usov’s 
contribution. 
Expansion of Russian and Chinese businesses in 
Belarus cannot be dissociated from the political 
context. While observing constant turmoils in 
Belarus – Russia relations and favouritism of 
Chinese investments let’s take a look at what role 
the EU plays in order not to let Belarus drift away 
from Europe. The article by the EESC analyst Zivile 
Dambrauskaite presents an overview of EU-Belarus 
relations over the last decade, identifying problems, 
mistakes and perspectives. 
Julija Narkeviciute, Editor
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A. Lukashenka and his inner circle monitor closely 
the process of privatization and exercise complete 
control over the entrance of Russian businesses onto 
the market. On one hand, Russian big businesses 
have better and faster chances to make necessary 
arrangements with A. Lukashenka. On the other 
hand, such order of things creates a direct threat 
for the economic security of the country. Yet under 
conditions of the global financial crisis huge finan-
cial resources in the hands of Russian businessmen 
makes their investments capable to ensure stability 
of the Belarusian economy. 
Finally, in order to strengthen positions of Russian 
businessmen Moscow pursues protectionist policy 
in order to retain its political influence in Belarus. 
As early as in the beginning of the new century a 
well-known Russian politician Anatoly Chubais 
claimed Russia should become a ‘liberal empire’. In 
other words, Russia should exert control over its 
neighbors, primarily over the former Soviet states, 
by using financial means, economic and energy 
leverages. Apparently Moscow seems to succeed 
in fulfilling this objective in Belarus. 
Already in 2009 Russia created a Business Council 
for Cooperation with Belarus that gathers over 70 
CEOs of Russian companies and enterprises, as well 
as representatives of the Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry and its regional departments, MFA, 
Ministry of Economic Development, Ministry of 
Industry and Trade, and the Permanent Committee 
of the Union State. The Council is co-founded by 
the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 
VTB Bank, the State Specialized Russian Export-
Import Bank, Joint-stock bank Rosbank, closed 
joint-stock company Yarovit Motors, open joint 
stock company Rosagroleasing, and closed joint-
stock company AtomStroyExport. Members of 
the Council are small and medium companies and 
enterprises of the Russian Federation as well.  The 
chair of its Supervisory Board is Mr. Pastukhov, 
senior vice-President of the Chamber of Trade and 
Commerce of the Russian Federation. The functions 
of chairman of the Business Council and chairman of 
Board of Directors are carried out by Mr. Biryukov, 
president of Yarovit.    
All big Russian businesses are present in the Belaru-
sian economy. Moreover, despite highlight declara-
tions by A. Lukashenka, they are gradually anchoring 
in Belarusian industry and banking spheres as well 
as in service sector. Among the most known Russian 
corporations that entered the Belarusian market 
the following should be mentioned:  Gazprom1, 
Тransneft, Lukoil, Alfa group, Severstal, financial 
stock corporation System, Uralkalii, Russian rail-
ways, Rosatom, Rostekhnologii, rocket space corpo-
1  In February 2010 the authorities of Belarus completed the trans-
action with Gazprom selling 50% of Beltransgaz stock to the Rus-
sian monopolist for $2.5 billion. The Russian corporation is in-
terested in buying the control stock of Beltransgaz.
ration Energy, Vneshekonombank, Vneshtorgbank, 
Sberbank of Russia 2, etc. 
Russia is the main creditor to Belarus. Since 2007 the 
total value of loans received from Russia amounted 
to 3 billion dollars.
The country’s leadership is trying to outweigh 
economic and financial dependence on Russia. For 
the first time in 15 years of A. Lukashenka’s rule, 
Belarus addressed the IMF that rendered Belarus 
a loan worth 2.87 billion dollars. 
However, dependence on Russia or IMF is evenly 
dangerous for the political regime. Condition set 
by Russia for crediting the Belarusian economy is 
privatization of Belarusian enterprises by Russian 
businesses, whereas the IMF sets the condition of 
economic transformation in the country. Fulfilling 
either of the conditions the Belarusian political 
regime loses the possibility to control the internal 
processes in the country. 
Will China Save the Belarusian Economy?  
In the given circumstances the Belarusian leader-
ship began to search for other sources to finance the 
national economy without threatening economic 
security and political stability. China seems to be 
one of the safest partners in this case. Certainly, A. 
Lukashenka has been actively entering into contacts 
with other undemocratic states such as Venezuela as 
well. Nevertheless, China excels any possible part-
ner in political weight and economic might. There 
are a number of indices that China is becoming an 
important strategic partner3 for Belarus.
First, high ranking officials of both countries 
regularly paid visits to each other. Vice president of 
Chinese People’s Republic Xi Jinping visited Minsk 
in March 2010.
Second, in 1997 commodity turnover between 
Belarus and China was a bit over $100 million, 
whereas in 2006 it exceeded $1 billion. According 
to the official data, in 2009 the commodity turnover 
reached almost $2.5 billion. Belarus exports potash 
fertilizers, caprolactam, mine trucks and spares, 
synthetic thread, tires, electronic microcircuits and 
micro assemblies as well as products of machine-
building industry. There is a number of Belarusian 
enterprises that have their representation offices in 
China: closed joint-stock (CJS) enterprise Belarusian 
Potassium Company, manufacturing republican 
unitary enterprise MWTP (Minsk Wheel Tractor 
Plant), manufacturing association (MA) Minsk Trac-
tor Works, MA BelAZ, JSC Integral, republican uni-
tary enterprise (RUE) Belarusian Steel Works, MA 
Gomselmash, RUE Belneftekhim, and air company 
TransAviaExport. In its turn, China supplies Belarus 
with equipment and raw materials. A number of 
2 As a result of negotiations in 2010 Sberbank of Russia has become 
a permanent consultant for the Belarusian economy. It is expect-
ed that Sberbank will start crediting a number of Belarusian en-
terprises in the coming months. Most probably, crediting will be 
directly linked to their privatization by Russian business struc-
tures. 
3 “Lomat:  Belarus will expand investment cooperation with Chi-
na”, http://telegraf.by/2010/03/lomat--belarus--rasshirit-investi-
cionnoe-sotrudnichestvo-s-kitaem.html. 
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Belarusian companies have their representatives 
and dealers in China who are working on creation 
joint production enterprises there. 
Last but not least is the significance of signing the 
contracts worth $3.4 billion between Belarus and 
China. In addition, China will provide Belarus 
with a consessionary credit of $1 billion for im-
plementing the projects approved by both parties 
and give Belarus a grant of 60 million yuans (about 
$ 8.8 million)4. 
Chinese grant of 8 million dollars should rather 
be considered as a symbolic act of support. The 
billion-dollar contracts will hardly save the Belarusian 
economy since the parties reached an agreement 
regarding those contracts, implementation of which 
will depend on a number of factors. It seems quite 
unlikely that Chinese businesses will be able to dis-
place Russian ones and to restrain Russian economic 
expansion. However, the Belarusian leadership is 
intensively creating an illusion that China will help 
Belarus in solving economic issues. A. Lukashenka 
exploits this myth trying to prove to the neighbors 
that neither Russian, nor European assistance is not 
needed. Possibly, the governor of Belarus hopes to 
get economic support from China on the basis of 
principles that worked with Russia until 2010, i.e. 
long and true friendship. A. Lukashenka is trying 
to persuade the Chinese leadership that Belarus 
is its faithful ally in Europe and the ‘prop on the 
4  “Belarus-China: reliable partners and true friends”, -http://www.
respublika.info/4967/topic/article38128/.
European continent’5. Obviously, Belarus needs 
cash. However, China is not rushing to finance the 
Belarusian regime and will not be willing to do so 
in the future. 
It’s difficult to imagine anyone selling friendship 
assurances to China. It is a pragmatic country look-
ing only after its own interests. China is essential 
for Belarus as a new market for selling industrial 
products, yet Belarus can be important for China 
only from a political outlook.  
One should not forget that the China, uncharged 
with moral obligations to support democratic val-
ues and the human rights, is actively cooperating 
with many dictatorships.  Development of relations 
between China and Belarus should be considered 
within the framework of China’s geopolitical in-
terests. It is becoming a global geopolitical player. 
Although at present China refrains from direct and 
open interference in global geopolitical processes, 
we should nonetheless expect that in the future 
this country might declare its geopolitical claims. 
China is already attempting to create its own ‘zones 
of presence’ on all continents (Chinese presence is 
mostly notable in Africa). Belarus can become such 
a ‘zone’ on the European continent where China 
has little political influence. Besides, China and 
Belarus have common grounds – the similarity of 
political systems and human rights problems. Both 
countries seem to benefit from mutual support on 
the international arena.
5  Ibid.
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The article aims at answering the following ques-
tions: how and why the EU-Belarus relationship was 
altering in the recent decade? What are the major 
problems of the EU policy with respect to Belarus? 
What are the prospects of the EU policy towards 
Belarus – is it possible to induce transformation of 
the existing regime from outside?
Let us first give an overview of the dynamics of the 
EU-Belarus relationship in order to respond to the 
posed questions.
Dynamics of the EU Policy with 
Respect to Belarus
1995 – 2004. Isolation of the 
‘Belarusian problem’
One of the major problems of the EU-Belarus 
relationship in the given period is the shortage of 
institutionalized partnership and absence of consist-
ent EU policy towards Belarus. Democratization of 
the post-soviet states after the Cold War made it 
possible to believe that the given processes would 
not bypass Belarus either. Moreover, Belarus was 
‘far away’ from the EU in geographic as well as in 
political sense – Belarus was neither a direct EU 
neighbour, nor a candidate country and this was 
the reason why political dynamics of Belarus was 
not considered as the ‘EU’s headache’.
The referendum in Belarus in 1996 that extended 
President A. Lukashenka’s term of office down to 
2001 became the first ‘disappointment’ of the EU 
with respect to Belarus. The given referendum 
precluded the Partnership and Cooperation Agree-
ment reached in 1995 between the EU and Belarus 
from entering into force.1 Thus a vacuum of the 
institutional political cooperation appeared. Yet 
1 Margarita M. Balmaceda, Sabine Fischer, Grzegorz Gromadzki, 
Andrei Liakhovich, Astrid Sahm, Vitali Silitski and Leonid Zlot-
nikov Back from the cold? The EU and Belarus in 2009, Institu-
te for Security Studies, 2009, < http://www.iss.europa.eu/uplo-
ads/media/cp119.pdf>.
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the EU perceived it as a resolution of the problem 
rather than part of it.
In the period of 2000-2004 undemocratic tenden-
cies of the Belarusian political regime intensified, 
starting with direct repressions and undemocratic 
elections in all levels of governance and ending up 
with alterations of the legal basis regulating activities 
of mass media and NGOs. In 2004 the EU started 
imposing sanctions on the Belarusian regime by 
declaring non-issuance of visas for Belarusian 
officials responsible for the holdout of the cases 
of the missing persons. In 2006 the given list was 
extended by including the persons responsible for 
the violation of international standards of holding 
elections. The EU chose the strategy of isolation 
expecting the isolated political system and econom-
ics of Belarus to “overheat” itself. 
Two major problems of the given policy were the 
following. First, Belarus was isolated only with 
respect to the EU but not Russia. Belarus not only 
failed to stay ‘lonely’, that type of policy made A. 
Lukashenka turn to the East for support. In the 
period of 1995-2004 Belarus participated in all 
initiatives launched by Russia aimed at integrating 
the CIS space. Second, isolation of Belarus and the 
development of the EU relations with other neigh-
bouring eastern countries resulted in isolation of 
Belarus from other countries of the region as well. 
This was the reason why the processes of democ-
ratization of the neighbouring East failed to affect 
Belarus, which in the meantime was developing 
stronger and closer ties with Russia.
2003/2004 – 2006. Towards the ‘Two-track’ 
Strategy
‘Colour revolutions’ in the Ukraine and Georgia 
encouraged expectations that perhaps this time 
Belarus would manage ‘to catch the train of de-
mocratization’. Besides, for the first time post-soviet 
states acceded the EU arousing hope of a successful 
cooperation with other post-soviet states – the 
new members of the EU became the ‘advocates’ 
of the eastern neighbourhood inside the EU. Just 
as important is the fact that the external border of 
the EU approached Belarus which meant that at 
least minimum cooperation is inevitable to ensure 
stability in the region. 
Yet the internal developments in Belarusian soon 
after the initiation of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP) prevented its inclusion into the ENP 
format whereas the ‘revolution’ collapsed even 
prior to its outset. The referendum of 2004 that was 
deemed unlawful by the international community 
granted A. Lukashenka the constitutional right to 
the lifelong presidency and the presidential elec-
tions of 2006 were deemed undemocratic.2 This 
induced the EU to impose additional sanctions on 
the Belarusian regime: to seize the EU deposits of 
the persons responsible for the illegal procedure 
of the elections. On the other hand, it became 
2 George Dura The EU’s Limited Response to Belarus’ Pseudo ‘New 
Foreign Policy’, CEPS, 2008, <http://www.ceps.be/book/eus-lim-
ited-response-belarus-pseudo-new-foreign-policy>.
evident that the EU instruments of leverage used 
in its relations with Belarus were not sufficient. 
The strategy of the EU ‘sanctions bearing human 
face’ had to be accelerated (the essential principle 
of the imposition of sanctions on Belarus was to 
ensure that the sanctions had to do only with the 
political regime; alongside with the isolation of 
the regime the support for the democratic forces 
of Belarus and the development of civic society 
was scheduled). That is why in 2005-2006 Belarus 
became the priority country for the Initiative to 
Support the European Democracy and Human 
Rights and prior to 2007 the European Instrument 
for Democracy and Human Rights was adjusted to 
finance NGOs unregistered in Belarus.3 Neverthe-
less, clear-cut conditions had to be defined what 
and what for the EU may propose to the Belarusian 
regime and Belarusian people. In December 2006 
the European Commission distributed a political 
document which defined the support and the 
privileges to the Belarusian people that could be 
granted if the Belarusian regime implemented the 
conditions listed in the document.4
The said document became the main paper de-
fining the EU-Belarus relations and the possible 
consolidation of cooperation. The initiative of the 
EU, however, to induce the Belarusian society to 
alter the regime from inside produced practically 
no impact: Belarusian NGOs and the opposition 
failed to communicate the given message to the 
Belarusian society and mobilize it whereas the 
Belarusian Government paid practically no atten-
tion to the document in question. The concept of 
the ‘two-track strategy’ was formed in that period: 
at least minimum contacts with the official Minsk 
were necessary due to the enlargement of the EU; 
on the other hand, it was pointless to expect radi-
cal changes of the regime, therefore it was logical 
to set pre-conditions and make the regime take 
liberal decisions by applying to them at the same 
time supporting the Belarusian civic society and 
democratic forces.
2006 - 2008. Crisis of the Russian – Belarusian 
Relations and A. Lukashenka’s ‘Turning back’ to 
Europe
In 2006-2007 when Russia started to gradually de-
crease energy subsidies to Belarus the Government 
of Belarus formulated The New Foreign Policy the 
basic principles whereof were the following:
Diversification of the import of energy resources. 
The given trend of the new A. Lukashenka’s policy 
was first of all devoted to the ‘internal consumption’, 
i.e. to show the society, that the President himself 
takes up the problems of the supply of energy 
resources. In 2007 A. Lukashenka was active in 
developing bilateral relations with countries that 
were able to propose an alternative to the energy 
resources of Russia (Venezuela, Iran, Azerbaijan, 
3 European Commission EU-Belarus Relations 2003-2005, <http://
ec.europa.eu/world/where/belarus/index_en.htm>.
4 European Commission Non-Paper What the European Union 
could bring to Belarus, <http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/
belarus/index_en.htm>.
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Nigeria and Norway). The same year we first 
learned about Belarus intentions to construct a 
nuclear power plant aimed at strengthening energy 
independence from Russia. The goal of the import 
of alternative energy resources remained very dif-
ficult to attain due to high prices, which exceeded 
even the increased prices for the Russian oil and 
gas whereas possibilities to invest into the energy 
infrastructure without applying for financial sup-
port to Russia were non-existent.
Attraction of foreign investments and improvement 
of the investment climate. Relationship crisis with 
Russia liberated the President’s administration from 
the illusions about Belarusian ‘economic miracle’ - it 
grew evident that centralized and closed economics 
of Belarus had no future. In 2007 individual Bela-
rusian ministries, agencies and state enterprises 
were instructed to submit proposals concerning the 
improvement of the Belarusian investment climate.5 
One of the most important goals was attraction 
of foreign investments and technologies (first and 
foremost, those of the EU countries). The following 
measures were envisaged as the most important: 
deferring of payments to investors, revocation 
of the ‘golden share’ mechanism6, ‘selling out’ of 
unprofitable state enterprises, preferential terms 
for Belarusian enterprises, that had taken credits 
abroad, reduction of the restrictions in jobbing 
the shares of enterprises. Alongside with the given 
measures the list of 519 state enterprises, which 
had to be reorganized in 2008-2010, was made and 
that of 147 enterprises, which had to be privatized 
in three years. Irrespective of that, liberalization 
of the economy was rather restricted and related 
only to some sectors of the economy and in the 
majority of cases – only to individual enterprises.7 
The new economic policy was dissociated from 
the normalization of working conditions therefore 
there was no positive reaction from the EU. In 2007 
Belarus was expelled from the Generalized System 
of Preferences as a result of the conclusions made 
by the Commission of the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) related to the unacceptable 
relations of the authorities with trade unions (that 
decision brings Belarus around 400 million Euro 
annual losses).
Cooperation with the EU in the fields of common 
interests. In 2007 the Government of Belarus sub-
mitted a proposal to the EU on the cooperation in 
the fields of energy (physical safety of oil and gas 
pipelines), transport and combating illegal migra-
tion. The EU, however rejected the given proposal 
– irrespective of the cosmetic liberalization of the 
5 George Dura The EU’s Limited Response to Belarus’ Pseudo ‘New 
Foreign Policy’, CEPS, 2008, <http://www.ceps.be/book/eus-limi-
ted-response-belarus-pseudo-new-foreign-policy>.
6  The given mechanism allowed the state to overtake control of an 
enterprise, irrespective of the share of stock that the state owns in 
that enterprise. Such a takeover was possible in case authorities 
decided that state interference was necessary due to unqualified 
enterprise management or a threat to the wellbeing of staff, una-
voidable bankruptcy etc. 
7   Kamil Klysinski, Agata Wierzbowska-Miazga Changes in the Po-
litical Elite, Economy and Society of Belarus. Appearances and 
Reality, Centre for Eastern Studies, 2009, <http://pdc.ceu.hu/ar-
chive/00005819/>.
economy there was no positive democratic dy-
namics in the internal policy of Belarus.8 The year 
2007 revealed quite clearly the boundaries of the 
EU possibilities to exercise impact on Belarus: the 
relationship of Russia and Belarus is based on the 
primitive ‘barter’ exchange, i.e. Russia’s support is 
given as an exchange for some concrete ‘services’, for 
example, the permission to acquire strategic objects 
or political support. It is granted quickly enabling 
the Belarusian regime to use gained support to 
solve internal problems and thus take the merits. 
Meanwhile the merit of the cooperation with the 
EU is indirect, diffused, aimed at the economy and 
the society in general. Such support fails to grant the 
regime the possibility to take the merits. Besides, 
proposing its support the EU poses certain precon-
ditions not related to concrete political exchange. 
The EU never asks for Belarusian ‘services’ as an 
exchange for its support, the EU requests certain 
alterations of the Belarusian regime itself and that 
is why the costs of cooperation for Lukashenka’s 
regime are far too high.
Irrespective of that, the need to modernize the 
Belarusian economy as well as the military Russian-
Georgian conflict made Belarus reflect one more 
time upon the merits of the rapprochement with 
the EU.
2008-2010. ‘Thaw’ in the EU-Belarus Relations?
The period of 2008-2010 should be considered as 
that of the breakthrough in the EU-Belarus rela-
tions: the EU decided to give to A. Lukashenka’s 
regime a certain dose of ‘advance trust’, i.e. to show 
that the EU is prepared to be flexible in making 
some concessions to Belarus if the dynamics of the 
Belarusian internal policy continues to be positive. 
In principle, this decision put an end to the period 
of isolation of the official regime of Belarus.
Institutional rapprochement:
In September 2008 a decision was taken to revise •	
the preconditions set by the EU to Belarus, the 
provisions of the 2006 document were made 
more flexible and more streamlined so that any 
positive dynamics of the Belarusian political 
regime could enhance mutual cooperation. In 
October 2008 a decision was made to resume 
the political dialogue with the Government of 
Belarus9.
In October 2008 the EU revoked its first sanc-•	
tions – rejection of visas for the top officials 
of Belarus was provisionally cancelled for six 
months with a possibility to extend the term 
8  George Dura The EU’s Limited Response to Belarus’ Pseudo ‘New 
Foreign Policy’, CEPS, 2008, <http://www.ceps.be/book/eus-limi-
ted-response-belarus-pseudo-new-foreign-policy>.
9  Margarita M. Balmaceda, Sabine Fischer, Grzegorz Gromadzki, 
Andrei Liakhovich, Astrid Sahm, Vitali Silitski and Leonid Zlot-
nikov Back from the cold? The EU and Belarus in 2009, Institu-
te for Security Studies, 2009, < http://www.iss.europa.eu/uplo-
ads/media/cp119.pdf>.
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thus giving time to the Government of Belarus 
to take up positive reforms10.
In 2008 three EU ‘troika’•	 11 meetings with the rep-
resentatives of the Belarusian Government took 
place, the European Commission commenced 
technical consultations with state agencies on 
the possible fields of cooperation.
In May 2009 Belarus was invited to participate •	
in the East European Initiative, in June the 
EU-Belarus dialogue on issues of human rights 
was initiated.
Political rapprochement: 
In February 2009 the High Representative for •	
the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the 
EU Javier Solana visited Belarus. 
In April 2009 visit of the President of Belarus to •	
Italy took place. The Belarusian governor met 
the Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and 
Pope Benedict  XVI.
In June 2009 the EU Commissioner of External •	
Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner made an of-
ficial visit to Minsk.
In September 2009 an official visit of the Presi-•	
dent of Belarus to Lithuania took place.
To sum up the above dynamics of the EU-Belarus 
relations the following EU dilemmas in the relations 
with Belarus may be singled out.
First, since Belarus ‘became the headache of the 
EU’ only after the enlargement and after the revolu-
tions in Georgia and the Ukraine, the EU attitude 
towards Belarus in terms of its goals and foreign 
policy instruments altered almost radically in the 
last decade: from the isolation of the Belarusian 
problems to radical expectations to alter regime 
in 2004 and finally towards the goal to transform 
the regime gradually. Today the EU policy towards 
Belarus is in fact oriented to a method, i.e. the ES 
pre-sets conditions and uses respectively either 
sanctions or privileges. The greatest drawback of 
the given policy is an inherent inconsistency and 
slow progress. Cycles are typical for the Belaru-
sian political life. Unfortunately, the EU policy 
still depends on these cycles: tightening of the 
control of mass media and civic society prior to 
each election period vs. ‘turning back to Europe’ 
each time negotiations on energy resources with 
Russia are taking place; making closer integration 
with Russia after the EU voices its dissatisfaction 
with the process of elections vs. assumption of 
international obligations of liberalization when 
loans from the international institutions are asked; 
initiatives to ‘soften’ the regime vs. dissatisfaction 
of the Belarusian opposition with the EU contacts 
with the official Minsk, etc. One of the biggest 
challenges for the EU in this case is to shape a 
10  Nicu Popescu & Andrew Wilson The Limits of Enlargement -lite: 
European and Russian Power in the Troubled Neighbourhood, 
European Council on Foreign Relations, 2009, <http://ecfr.3cdn.
net/66e95c3cd50b72d59a_87m6y59xi.pdf>.
11  EU ‘troika’: Foreign Minister of the presiding state in the EU Co-
uncil, a representative of the EU foreign policy, the EU Commis-
sioner for foreign relations. 
consistent policy towards Belarus and determine 
concrete measures that are independent from the 
said political cycles.
Possibilities to Enhance Transformation of the 
Present Belarusian Regime From Outside
Is it Possible to Enhance Economic Liberalization 
of the Regime?
The scope of liberalization of the economy of 
Belarus in 2008 is insignificant in terms of market 
economy but the majority of experts agree that 
for Belarus that was a fundamental leap forwards. 
Although A. Lukashenka’s regime chose the ‘Russian 
pattern’ (partial opening for foreign investments 
and technologies without any essential structural 
reforms) for modernization of its economy and the 
consequences of the world financial crisis forced to 
slow down the rate of privatization, a ‘hunger’ for 
foreign investments and technologies remains one 
of the most significant levers in the hands of the EU. 
Alterations of the Belarusian elite that took place 
alongside with the said reforms make it possible to 
forecast that successful partial liberalization of the 
economy would ensure a need for deeper reforms 
in the future.
Alterations of the Ruling Elite and Their EU-Russia 
Orientations
The year 2007 was significant for Belarus in terms 
of the alteration of the ruling elite. Oligarchic sys-
tem of the elite in its classical sense does not exist 
in Belarus – all elite groups are strictly controlled 
directly by the President himself by means of sta-
ble reshuffling of posts’ system as well as due to 
overlapping jurisdictions of institutions. Prior to 
2007 welfare and property of the nomenclature was 
directly linked with appointments by the President 
as well as associated with a post held12. In terms of 
the political influence the Belarusian nomenclature 
possesses only an advisory status, therefore it offers 
no ideological competition to the President. Prior 
to 2007-2008 the most influential elite groups in 
Belarus were the so-called ‘siloviki’ (people of force13 
- heads of the power structures: Secretariat of the 
Security Council, KGB, Ministry of the Interior) and 
the Mogiliov clan – the circle of A. Lukashenka’s 
closest friends and fellow-countrymen. Both groups 
are highly pro-Russian and conservative.
The year 2007, however, brought some changes. 
Victor Lukashenka (A. Lukashenka’s son) was 
appointed the member of the State Security 
Council by the President’s decree. The hope that V. 
12  Kamil Klysinski, Agata Wierzbowska-Miazga, Changes in the Po-
litical Elite, Economy and Society of Belarus. Appearances and 
Reality, Centre for Eastern Studies, 2009, <http://pdc.ceu.hu/ar-
chive/00005819/>.
13  The term ‘siloviki’ (from Russian ‘silovye struktury’ – structures 
of power) defines special elite groups in Belarus and Russia. They 
are top officials of the state security, law and order and heads of 
the armed forces that are united by several features: most often 
‘siloviki’ have inherited their posts from the times of the Soviet 
Union, they have uniform world outlook, interests and coope-
ration in pursuance of their goals. The most significant features 
of their world outlook are the aspiration to consolidate and con-
centrate the power of the state, anti-western attitudes, aspiration 
to monitor and weaken the economic elite of the state, etc.
In 2007 Belarus was 
expelled from the 
Generalized System 
of Preferences 
as a result of the 
conclusions made 
by the Commission 
of the International 
Labour Organization 
(ILO) (that decision 
brings Belarus 
around 400 million 
Euro annual losses).
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Lukashenka would succeed the present President 
in his post commenced the formation of the new 
elite group – dynamic and ‘modern’ young people 
who have no ties whatsoever with the clans of the 
old nomenclature. Members of the ‘youth group’ 
are representatives of the administration of the 
President, heads of the public analytical institu-
tions, Central Bank and border control officials. 
The task of the new group was a gradual takeover 
of the control of law and order as well as security 
institutions and thus ousting the old ‘siloviki’ and 
the Mogiliov clan. In 2008 on the initiative of the 
President the reshuffle of posts in power structures 
took place and repeated ‘cleansings’ were under-
taken for the benefit of the ‘youth group’14.
In 2008 the restructuring of the public enterprises 
and other presidential decisions made it possible for 
the nomenclature to obtain property and make their 
income legal. This was a chance to consolidate the 
power of one more – so far less influential – group 
of technocrats (heads of major state enterprises). 
Besides, this granted so far non-existent economic 
liberty to the Belarusian elite15.
What prospects are opened to the EU policy by 
the given changes? Unlike ‘siloviki’ and Mogiliov 
clan the arising elite of today is not ideologized. 
The basic task of the given groups is to protect the 
Belarusian economy from bankruptcy and at the 
same time to ensure state sovereignty on which 
their positions depend. That is why the new elite 
do not support integration with Russia, the more 
so that it is incapable of helping Belarus to imple-
ment technological modernization. The new elite 
pay greater attention to cooperation with the West. 
It has to be noted that new leaders are westernized 
and pragmatic but not democratic – they seek to 
consolidate their influence which is indispensable 
to the consolidation of the regime. Therefore, long-
term alterations of the Belarusian elite may mean 
that the EU could expect more pragmatic and 
more easily forecast partnership with Belarus but 
it may not expect Belarus to become a European 
democratic state.
Opposition and the Society of Belarus: Are They 
Pillars of the New EU Policy or a Challenge?
A paradox of the EU-Belarus relations is the fact 
that Belarusian democratic powers, perceived by the 
EU as an engine of possible changes, today are the 
greatest critics of the EU policy. The majority of the 
representatives of the United Democratic Forces of 
14  In 2007 Victor Sheiman (non-formal leader of Belarusian ‘silo-
viki’) was dismissed from the post of advisor to the President on 
security issues and Victor Lukashenka became the only counsel 
on the given issues. In 2008 the member of the Belarusian ‘silo-
viki’ group, the head of the KGB general Sukharenka was dismis-
sed due to his disapproval of the post reshuffle policy (appoint-
ment of a close Victor Lukashenka’s friend Ihar Rachkusky the 
head of the State Border Control Forces). Sukharenka was repla-
ced by the head of the President’s Security Service Jurij Zhado-
bin. Thus the ‘siloviki’ were divested of the control of two power 
structures and the possibility to shape security policy. The dec-
line of the ‘siloviki’ clan continued in 2009 as well.
15  Kamil Klysinski, Agata Wierzbowska-Miazga Changes in the Po-
litical Elite, Economy and Society of Belarus. Appearances and 
Reality, Centre for Eastern Studies, 2009. <http://pdc.ceu.hu/ar-
chive/00005819/>.
Belarus are of the opinion that under the conditions 
of economic recession the West should have either 
completely isolated A. Lukashenka’s regime and 
should have demanded democratic reforms while 
developing the dialogue with the direct participa-
tion of the opposition16. The Eastern Partnership 
Initiative provides exactly for the latter format of 
cooperation but in order to become a reliable partner 
of the EU in ensuring democratic development of 
the Belarusian regime, the democratic forces has 
to change itself since the opposition today faces a 
lot of problems17.
First, there is a discord over the ultimate goal. 
Representatives of democratic forces do not agree 
whether their goal is to change the regime or to 
become a parliamentary and constitutional op-
position hereby acquiring a chance to transform 
the regime gradually from inside. Such discord 
provokes fragmentation of the opposition. And 
although ideological differences of the parties may 
not be considered an undemocratic phenomenon 
per se but the discord that obstructs at least mini-
mum cooperation is a fundamental problem that 
contributed to the failure of the democratic forces 
in their preparation for the election campaign in 
2008. One more problem is the contraposition of the 
‘centre’ and ‘regions’ due to differences of agendas 
and problems of financing. No need to say that all 
these factors weaken opposition’s possibilities to 
mobilize population.
Mutual competition enlarges distrust and al-
lows A. Lukashenka to manipulate: in 2008 A. 
Lukashenka’s policy of the ‘regime softening’ and 
selective consultations with some opposition 
powers brought even greater controversy among 
the democratic forces. In its turn disagreements 
provoked speculation that, following the Russian 
example, A. Lukashenka tried to create ‘loyal’ 
opposition.
Just as important is the fact that the gap between 
the society and the democratic forces is enormous. 
Democratic forces are unable to mobilize society 
beyond the boundaries of their habitual democratic 
electorate. Irrespective of their activities, support of 
A. Lukashenka amounts to around 45 per cent.
Staying outside the boundaries of the system 
opposition leaders have no experience in policy 
shaping, coalition building as well as making and 
implementing decisions. In other words, beyond 
the boundaries of the Belarusian regime there is 
not enough cadre having sufficient competence 
and experience to rule a democratic state. 
And finally it is questionable whether the opposi-
tion is itself democratic18.
Participation in the official formats of the EU is 
one of the best ways to unite, mobilize and train 
the opposition, which in the longer run would be 
able to submit an alternative to A. Lukashenka’s 
16  Ibid.
17  Ibid.
18  Vytis Jurkonis Lithuanian Policy with Respect to Belarus: Are We 
Sure What We Are Up To?, EESC, Rytų Pulsas Nr. 2 (30), 2010, < 
http://www.eesc.lt/public_files/file_1268745357.pdf>.
The need to 
modernize the 
Belarusian economy 
as well as the military 
Russian-Georgian 
conflict made Belarus 
reflect one more time 
upon the merits of the 
rapprochement with 
the EU.
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regime. That is why participation of Belarus in the 
formats of political cooperation within the frame-
work of Eastern Partnership Initiative (EPI) is of 
paramount importance. In this sense the EU will 
have to make a compromise with A. Lukashenka’s 
regime. Elimination of Belarus from the EPI or 
Euronest due to undemocratic elections should not 
become an alternative since such decision would 
only ‘gum up’ the internal situation of Belarus for 
even a longer period.
Today the EU policy 
towards Belarus is 
in fact oriented to a 
method, i.e. the ES 
pre-sets conditions 
and uses respectively 
either sanctions or 
privileges.
